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III.—EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATION^. 
By G. E. MOOKB. 
IN the index to Appearance and Reality (First Edition) 
Mr. Bradley declares that all relations are "intrinsical"; and 
the following are some of the phrases by means of which he 
tries to explain what he means by this assertion. " A relation 
must at both ends affect, and pass into, the being of its terms " 
(p. 364). "Every relation essentially penetrates the being of 
its terms, and is, in this sense, intrinsical" (p. 392). " To stand 
in a relation and not to be relative, to support it and yet not to 
be infected and undermined by it, seems out of the question " 
(p. 142). And a good many other philosophers seem inclined 
to take the same view about relations which Mr. Bradley is 
here trying to express. Other phrases which seem to be some-
times used to express it, or a part of it, are these: "No 
relations are purely external" ; " All relations qualify or modify 
or make a difference to the terms between which they hold"; 
" No terms are independent of any of the relations in which 
they stand to other terms" (See e.g., Joachim, The Nature of 
Truth, pp. 11, 12, 46). 
I t is, I think, by no means easy to make out exactly what 
these philosophers mean by these assertions. And the main 
object of this paper is to try to define clearly one proposition, 
which, even if it does not give the whole of what they mean, 
seems to me to be always implied by what they mean, and to be 
certainly false. I shall try to make clear the exact meaning of 
this proposition, to point out some of its most important conse-
quences, and to distinguish it clearly from certain other proposi-
tions which are, I think, more or less liable to be confused with 
 by guest on June 10, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS. 41 
it. And I shall maintain that, if we give to the assertion that 
a relation is " internal" the meaning which this proposition 
would give to it, then, though, in that sense, some relations are 
" internal," others, no less certainly, are not, but are " purely 
external." 
To begin with, we may, I think, clear the ground, by putting 
on one side two propositions about relations, which, though they 
seem sometimes to be confused with the view we are discussing, 
do, I think, quite certainly not give the whole meaning of that 
view. 
The first is a proposition which is quite certainly and 
obviously true of all relations, without exception, and which, 
though it raises points of great difficulty, can, I think, be 
clearly enough stated for its truth to be obvious. I t is the 
proposition that, in the case of any relation whatever, the kind 
of fact which we express by saying that a given term A has 
that relation to another term B, or to a pair of terms B and 0, 
or to three terms B, C, and T>, and so on, in no case simply 
consists in the terms in question together with the relation. 
Thus the fact which we express by saying that Edward VII was 
father of George V obviously does not simply consist in 
Edward, George, and the relation of fatherhood. In order that 
the fact may be, it is obviously not sufficient that there should 
merely be George and Edward and the relation of fatherhood; 
it is further necessary that the relation should relate Edward to 
George, and not only so, but also that it should relate them in 
the particular way which we express by saying that Edward 
was father of George, and not merely in the way which we 
should express by saying that George was father of Edward. 
This proposition is, I think, obviously true of all relations 
without exception; and the only reason why I have mentioned 
it is because, in an article in which Mr. Bradley criticizes 
Mr. Eussell (Mind, 1910, p. 179), he seems to suggest that it is 
inconsistent with the proposition that any relations are merely 
external, and because, so far as I can make out, some other 
i) 2 
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42 G. B. MOORE. 
people who maintain that all relations are internal seem some-
times to think that their contention follows from this proposi-
tion. The way in which Mr. Bradley puts it is that such facts 
are unities which are not completely analysable; and this is, of 
course, true, if it means merely that in the case of no such fact 
is there any set of constituents of which we can truly say : 
This fact is identical with these constituents. But whether from 
this it follows that all relations are internal must of course 
depend upon what is meant by the latter statement. If it be 
merely used to express this proposition itself, or anything .which 
follows from it, then, of course, there can be no doubt that all 
relations are internal. But I think there is no doubt that those 
who say this do not mean by their words merely this obvious 
proposition itself; and I am going to point out something which 
I think they always imply, and which certainly does not follow 
from it. 
The second proposition, which, I think, may be put aside at 
once as certainly not giving the whole of what is meant, is the 
proposition which is, I think, the natural meaning of the 
phrases " All relations modify or affect their terms " or " All 
relations make a difference to their terms." There is one 
perfectly natural and intelligible sense in which a given 
relation may be said to modify a term which stands in that 
relation, namely, the sense in which we should say that, if, by 
putting a stick of sealing-wax into a flame, we make the 
sealing wax melt, its relationship to the flame has modified 
the sealing-wax. This is a sense of the word " modify" in 
which part of what is meant by saying of any term that it is 
modified, is that it has actually undergone a change: and 
I think it is clear that a sense in which this is part of its 
meaning is the only one in which the word " modify" can 
properly be used. If, however, those who say that all relations 
modify their terms were using the word in this, its proper 
sense, part of what would be meant by this assertion would be 
that all terms which have relations at all actually undergo 
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EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS. 43 
changes. Such an assertion would be obviously false, for the 
simple reason that there are terms which have relations and 
which yet never change at all. And I think it is quite clear 
that those who assert that all relations are internal, in the 
sense we are concerned with, mean by this something which 
could be consistently asserted to be true of all relations 
without exception, even if it were admitted that some terms 
which have relations do not change. "When, therefore, they 
use the phrase that all relations " modify" their terms as 
equivalent to " all relations are internal," they must be using 
" modify" in some metaphorical sense other than its natural 
one. I think, indeed, that most of them would be inclined to 
assert that in every case in which a term A comes to have to 
another term B a relation, which it did not have to B in some 
immediately preceding interval, its having of that relation to 
that term causes it to undergo some change, which it would 
not have undergone if it had not stood in precisely that 
relation to B; and I think perhaps they would think that this 
proposition follows from some proposition which is true of all 
relations, without exception, and which is what they mean by 
saying that all relations are internal. The question whether 
the coming into a new relation does thus always cause some 
modification in the term which comes into it is one which is 
often discussed, as if it had something to do with the question 
whether all relations are internal; as when, for instance, it is 
discussed whether knowledge of a thing alters the thing known. 
And for my part I should maintain that this proposition is 
certainly not true. But what I am concerned with now is not 
the question whether it is true, but simply to point out that, 
so far as I can see, it can have nothing to do with the 
question whether all relations are internal, for the simple 
reason that it cannot possibly follow from any proposition 
with regard to all relations without exception. I t asserts with 
regard to all relational properties of a certain kind, that they 
have a certain kind of effect; and no proposition of this sort 
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44 G. E. MOORE. 
can, I think, follow from any universal proposition with regard 
to all relations. 
We have, therefore, rejected, as certainly not giving the 
whole meaning of the dogma that all relations are internal: 
(1) the obviously true proposition that no relational facts are 
completely analy sable, in the precise sense which I gave to that 
assertion; and (2) the obviously false proposition that all 
relations modify their terms, in the natural sense of the term 
" modify," in which it always has as part of its meaning " cause 
to undergo a change." And we have also seen that this false 
proposition that any relation which a term comes to have 
always causes it to undergo a change is wholly irrelevant to the 
question whether all relations are internal or not. We have 
seen finally that if the assertion that all relations modify 
their terms is to be understood as equivalent to the assertion 
that all are internal, " modify " must be understood in some 
metaphorical sense. The question is: What is this meta-
phorical sense ? 
And one point is, I think, pretty clear to begin with. It is 
obvious that, in the case of some relations, a given term A may 
have the relation in question, not only to one other term, but 
to several different terms. If, for instance, we consider the 
relation of fatherhood, it is obvious that a man may be father, 
not only of one, but of several different children. And those 
who say that all relations modify their terms always mean, I 
think, not merely that every different relation which a term has 
modifies i t ; but also that, where the relation is one which the 
term has to several different other terms, then, in the case of 
each of these terms, it is modified by the fact that it has the 
relation in question to that particular term. If, for instance, A 
is father of three children, B, C, and D, they mean to assert 
that he is modified, not merely by being a father, but by being 
the father of B, also by being the father of C, and also by being 
the father of D. The mere assertion that all relations modify 
their terms does not, of course, make it quite clear that this is 
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EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS. 45 
what is meant; but I think there is no doubt that it is always 
meant; and, I think, we can express it more clearly by using a 
term, which I have already introduced, and saying the doctrine 
is that all relational properties modify their terms, in a sense 
which remains to be defined. I think there is no difficulty in 
understanding what I mean by a relational property. If A is 
father of B, then what you assert of A when you say that he 
is so is a relational property—namely, the property of being 
father of B ; and it is quite clear that this property is not itself 
a relation, in the same fundamental sense in which the relation 
of fatherhood is so; and also that, if C is a different child from 
B, then the property of being father of C is a different relational 
property from that of being father of B, although there is only 
one relation, that of fatherhood, from which both are derived. 
So far as I can make out, those philosophers who talk of all 
relations being internal, often actually mean by '•' relations," 
" relational properties ": when they talk of all the relations of 
a given term, they mean all its relational properties, and not 
merely all the different relations, of each of which it is true 
that the term has that relation to something. I t will, I think, 
conduce to clearness to use a different word for these two entirely 
different uses of the term " relation ": to call " fatherhood " a 
relation, and " fatherhood of B " a " relational property." And 
the fundamental proposition, which is meant by the assertion 
that all relations are internal, is, I think, a proposition with 
regard to relational properties, and not with regard to relations 
properly so-called. There is no doubt that those who maintain 
this dogma mean to maintain that all relational properties are 
related in a peculiar way to the terms which possess them— 
that they modify or are internal to them, in some metaphorical 
sense. And once we have denned what this sense is in which 
a relational 'property can be said to be internal to a term which 
possesses it, we can easily derive from it a corresponding sense 
in which the relations, strictly so called, from which relational 
properties are derived, can be said to be internal. 
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46 G. E. MOORE. 
Our question is then: What is the metaphorical sense of 
"modify" in which the proposition that all relations are 
internal is equivalent to the proposition that all relational 
properties " modify " the terms which possess them ? I think 
it is clear that the term "modify" would never have been 
used at all to express the relation meant, unless there had 
been some analogy between this relation and that which we 
have seen is the proper sense of " modify," namely, causes to 
change. And I think we can see where the analogy comes 
in by considering the statement, with regard to any particular 
term A and any relational property <f>, which belongs to it, 
that A would have been different from what it is if it had not 
had <p: the statement, for instance, that Edward VII would 
have been different if he had not been father of George V. 
This is a thing which we can obviously truly say of A and <f>, 
in some sense, whenever it is true of <f> that it modified A in 
the proper sense of the word: if the being held in the flame 
causes the sealing-wax to melt, we can truly say (in some 
sense) that the sealing-wax would not have been in a melted 
state if it had not been in the flame. But it seems as if it 
were a thing which might also be true of A and <£, where 
it is not true that the possession of <f> caused A to change; 
since the mere assertion that A would have been different, 
if it had not had <f>, does not necessarily imply that the 
possession of tf> caused A to have any property which it would 
not have had otherwise. And those who say that all relations 
are internal do sometimes tend to speak as if what they 
meant could be put in the form : In the case of every relational 
property which a thing has, it is always true that the thing 
which has it would have been different if it had not had that 
property; they sometimes say even: If 0 be a relational 
property and A a term which has it, then it is always true 
that A would not have been A if it had not had (j>. This is, 
I think, obviously a clumsy way of expressing anything which 
could possibly be true, since, taken strictly, it- implies the 
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EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS. 47 
self-contradictory proposition that if A had not had <£, it would 
not have been true of A that it did not have <j>. But it is never-
theless a more or less natural way of expressing a proposition 
which might quite well be true, namely, that, supposing A 
has <f>, then anything which had not had <j> would necessarily 
have been different from A. This is the proposition which 
I wish to suggest as giving the metaphorical meaning of $ 
modifies A, of which we are in search. I t is a proposition 
to which I think a perfectly precise meaning can be given, 
and one which does not at all imply that the possession of <f> 
caused any change in A, but which might conceivably be true 
of all terms, and all the relational properties they have, without 
exception. And it seems to me that it is not unnatural that 
the proposition that this is true of $ and A, should have been 
expressed in the form, " <\> modifies A," since it can be more 
or less naturally expressed in the perverted form, " If A had 
not had <£ it would have been different,"—a form of words, 
which, as we saw, can also be used whenever <j> does, in the 
proper sense, modify A. 
I want to suggest, then, that one thing which is always 
implied by the dogma that, "All relations are internal," is 
that, in the case of every relational property, it can always 
be truly asserted of any term x which has that property, 
that any term which had not had it would necessarily have been 
different from x. 
This is the proposition to which I want to direct attention. 
And there are two phrases in it, which require some further 
explanation. 
The first is the phrase " would necessarily have been." And 
the meaning of this can be explained, in a preliminary way, as 
follows :—To say of a pair of properties ^ and yjr, that any term 
which had had <j> would necessarily have had i/r, is equivalent 
to saying that, in every case, from the proposition with regard 
to any given term that it has <f>, it follows that that term 
has ty : follows being understood in the sense in which from the 
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48 G. E. MOOEE. 
proposition with regard to any term, that it is a right angle, it 
follows that it is an angle, and in which from the proposition 
with regard to any term that it is red it follows that it is 
coloured. There is obviously some very important sense in 
which from the proposition that a thing is a right angle, it 
does follow that it is an angle, and from the proposition that a 
thing is red it does follow that it is coloured. And what I am 
maintaining is that the metaphorical sense of "modify," in 
which it is maintained that all relational properties modify 
the subjects which possess them, can be denned by reference to 
this sense of " follows." The definition is : To say of a given 
relational property <f> that it modifies or is internal to a given 
term A which possesses it, is to say that from the proposition 
that a thing has not got <j> it follows that that thing is different 
from A. In other words, it is to say that the property of not 
possessing <f>, and the property of being different from A are 
related to one another in the peculiar way in which the pro-
perty of being a right-angled triangle is related to that of being 
a triangle, or that of being red to that of being coloured. 
To complete the definition it is necessary, however, to 
define the sense in which " different from A " is to be under-
stood. There are two different senses which the statement 
that A is different from B may bear. It may be meant merely 
that A is numerically different from B, other than B, not 
identical with B. Or it may be meant that not only is this the 
case, but also that A is related to B in a way which can be 
roughly expressed by saying that A is qualitatively different 
from B. And of these two meanings, those who say: That all 
relations make a difference to their terms, always, I think, 
mean difference in the latter sense and not merely in the 
former. That is to say, they mean, that if <j> be a relational 
property which belongs to A, then the absence of </> entails not 
only numerical difference from A, but qualitative difference. 
But, in fact, from the proposition that a thing is qualitatively 
different from A, it does follow that it is also numerically 
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EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS. 49 
different. And hence they are maintaining that every rela-
tional property is " internal t o" its terms in both of two 
different senses at the same time. They are maintaining that, 
if 0 be a relational property which belongs to A, than <f> is 
internal to A both in the sense (1) that the absence of <j> 
entails qualitative difference from A; and (2) that the absence 
of <f> entails numerical difference from A. It seems to me that 
neither of these propositions is true; and I will say something 
about each in turn. 
As for the first, I said before that I think some relational 
properties really are " internal to " their terms, though by no 
means all are. But, if we understand " internal to " in this 
first sense, I am not really sure that any are. In order to get 
an example of one which was, we should have, I think, to say 
that any two different qualities are always qualitatively different 
from one another: that, for instance, it is not only the case 
that anything which is pure red is qualitatively different from 
anything which is pure blue, but that the quality " pure red " 
itself is qualitatively different from the quality "pure blue." 
I am not quite sure that we can say this, but I think we can; 
and if so, it is easy to get an example of a relational property 
which is internal in our first sense. The quality " orange " is 
intermediate in shade between the qualities yellow and red. 
This is a relational property, and it is quite clear that, on our 
assumption, it is an internal one. Since it is quite clear that 
any quality which were not intermediate between yellow and 
red, would necessarily be other than orange ; and if any quality 
other than orange must be qualitatively different from orange, 
then it follows that " intermediate between yellow and red " is 
internal to " orange." That is to say, the absence of the 
relational property " intermediate between yellow and red," 
entails the property " different in quality from orange." 
There is then, I think, a difficulty in being sure that any 
relational properties are internal in this first sense. But, if 
what we want to do is to show that some are not, and that 
 by guest on June 10, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
50 G. B. *MOORE. 
therefore the dogma that all relations are internal is false, I 
think the most conclusive reason for saying this is that if all 
were internal in this first sense, all would necessarily be 
internal in the second, and that this is plainly false. I think, 
in fact, the most important consequence of the dogma that all 
relations are internal, is that it follows from it that all rela-
tional properties are internal in this second sense. I propose, 
therefore, at once to consider this proposition, with a view to 
bringing out quite clearly what it means and involves, and 
what are the main reasons for saying that it is false. 
The proposition in question is that, if ^ be a relational 
property and A a term to which it does in fact belong, then, no 
matter what <J3 and A may be, it may always be truly asserted 
of them, that any term which had not possessed <£ would neces-
sarily have been other than—numerically different from—A : 
or, in other words, that A would necessarily, in all conceivable 
circumstances, have possessed <f>. And with this sense of 
" internal," as distinguished from that which says qualitatively 
different, it is quite easy to point out some relational properties 
which certainly are internal in this sense. Let us take as an 
example the relational property which we assert to belong to a 
visual sense-datum, when we say of it that it has another visual 
sense-datum as a spatial part : the assertion, for instance, with 
regard to a coloured patch half of which is red and half yellow: 
" This whole patch contains this patch " (where " this patch " is 
a proper name for the red half). I t is here, I think, quite plain 
that, in a perfectly clear and intelligible sense, we can say that 
any whole, which had not contained that red patch, could not 
have been identical with the whole in question: that from the 
proposition with regard to any term whatever that it does not 
contain that particular patch it follows that that term is other 
than the whole in question—though not necessarily that it is 
qualitatively different from it. That particular whole could 
not have existed without having that particular patch for a part. 
But it seems no less clear, at first sight, that there are many 
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EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS. 51 
other relational properties of which this is not true. In order 
to get an example, we have only to consider the relation which 
the red patch has to the whole patch, instead of considering as 
before that which the whole has to it. I t seems quite clear that, 
though the whole could not have existed without having the red 
patch for a part, the red patch might perfectly. well have 
existed without being part of that particular whole. In other 
words, though every relational property of the form " having 
this for a spatial par t" is "internal" in our sense, it seems 
equally clear that every property of the form " is a spatial part 
of this whole " is not internal, but purely external. Yet this 
last, according to me, is one of the things which the dogma of 
internal relations denies. I t implies that it is just as neces-
sary that anything, which is in fact a part of a particular wholes 
should be a part of that whole, as that any whole, which has a 
particular thing for a part, should have that thing for a part. 
I t implies, in fact, quite generally, that any term which does 
in fact have a particular relational property, could not have 
existed without having that property. And in saying this it 
obviously flies in the face of common sense. I t seems quite 
obvious that in the case of many relational properties which 
things have, the fact that they have them is a mere matter of 
fact: that the things in question might have existed without 
having them. That this, which seems obvious, is true, seems to 
me to be the most important thing that can be meant by saying 
that some relations are purely external. And the difficulty is 
to see how any philosopher could have supposed that it was 
not true: that, for instance, the relation of part to whole is no 
more external than that of whole to part. I will give at once 
one main reason which seems to me to have led to the view, 
that all relational properties are internal in this sense. 
What I am maintaining is the common-sense view, which 
seems obviously true, that it may be true that A has in fact 
got <f>, and yet also true that A might have existed without 
having <f>. And I say that this is equivalent to saying that it 
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52 G. E. MOORE. 
may be true that A has <f>, and yet not true that from the pro-
position that a thing has not got <j> it follows that that thing is 
other than A—numerically different from it. And one reason 
why this is disputed is. I think, simply because it is in fact true 
that if A has <£, and x has not, it does follow that x is other than 
A. These two propositions, the one which I admit to be true 
(1) that if A has 0, and x has not, it does follow that x is other 
than A, and the one which I maintain to be false (2) that if 
A has <j), then from the proposition with regard to any term x 
that it has not got <f>, it follows that x is other than A, are, I 
think, easily confused with one another. And it is in fact the 
case that if they are not different, or if (2) follows from (1), 
then no relational properties are external. For (1) is certainly 
true, and (2) is certainly equivalent to asserting that none are. 
I t is therefore absolutely essential, if we are to maintain 
external relations, to maintain that (2) does not follow from (1). 
These two propositions (1) and (2), with regard to which I 
maintain that (1) is true, and (2) is false, can be put in another 
way, as follows: (1) asserts that if A has $, then any term 
which has not; must be other than A. (2) asserts that if A 
has $, then any term which had not, would necessarily he other 
than A. And when they are put in this form, it is, I think, 
easy to see why they should be confused: you have only to 
confuse " must " or " is necessarily " with " would necessarily 
be." And their connexion with the question of external relations 
can be brought out as follows : To maintain external relations 
you have to maintain such things as that, though Edward VII 
was in fact father of George V, he might have existed without 
being father of George V. But to maintain this you have to 
maintain that it is not true that a person who was not father of 
George would necessarily have been other than Edward. Yet 
it is, in fact, the case, that any person who was not father of 
George must have been other than Edward. Unless, therefore, 
you can maintain that from this true proposition it does not 
follow that any person 'who was not father of George would 
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EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS. 53 
necessarily have been other than Edward, you will have to give 
up the view that Edward might have existed without being 
father of George. 
By far the most important point in connexion with the 
dogma of internal relations seems to me to be simply to see 
clearly the difference between these two propositions (1) and (2), 
and that (2) does not follow from (1). If this is not under-
stood, nothing in connexion with the dogma can, I think, be 
understood. And perhaps the difference may seem so clear, 
that no more need be said about it. But 1 cannot help thinking 
it is not clear to everybody, and that it does involve the 
rejection of certain views, which are sometimes held as to the 
meaning of " follows." So I will try to put the point again in 
a perfectly strict form. 
Let <\> be a relational property, and A a term to which it does 
in fact belong. I propose to define what is meant by saying 
that </> is internal to A (in the sense we are now concerned 
with) as meaning that from the proposition that a thing has 
not got <p, it " follows " that it is other than A. 
That is to say, this proposition asserts that between the two 
properties " not having <f>" and " other than A," there holds that 
relation which holds between the property "being a right angle" 
and the property " being an angle," or between the property " red " 
and the property " coloured," and which we express by saying 
that, in the case of any term whatever, from the proposition 
that that term is a right angle, it follows, or is deducible, that 
it is an angle. Let us express the relation which we assert to 
hold between a particular proposition p, and a particular 
proposition q, when we say that in this sense q " follows from " 
or " is deducible from " p, by the symbol " ent " ; which I have 
chosen to express it, because it may be used a3 an abbreviation 
for " entails," and because "p entails q" is a natural expression 
for " q follows from p," i.e., " entails " can naturally be used as 
the converse of "follows from." (We cannot unambiguously 
use the phrase " p implies q" as equivalent to " q follows 
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from p," though it is in fact often so used, because, especially 
in consequence of Mr. Eussell's writings, " implies " has come 
to be used as a name for a totally different relation: we might 
perhaps use "p logically implies q" or "p formally implies q," 
though Mr. Eussell has also given a different meaning to 
" formal " implication), "p ent q " will then assert that there 
holds between p and q that relation which holds, for instance, 
between the two premisses of a syllogism in Barbara, taken as 
one conjunctive proposition, and the conclusion, equally whether 
the premisses be true or false; and which does not hold, for 
instance, between the proposition " Socrates was a man " and 
the proposition " Socrates was a mortal," even though it be in 
fact true that all men are mortal. And we can express the 
assertion that <f> is " internal to " A, using (I hope correctly) 
the symbols of Principia Mathematica, in addition to our new 
symbol " ent" by saying that what it asserts is: 
(»):-»- (jiX. ent . x ^ A ; 
or, in other words: " for all values of x, the proposition that 
you get by asserting of a particular value of x, say B, that B 
has not got <f>, entails the proposition that B is other than A." 
The assertion with regard to a particular term A and a par-
ticular relational property $, which A actually has, that $ is 
internal to A means then : (x): ^~ <j)X. ent. x &^ A. And this 
is, of course, logically equivalent to : (x): x = A . ent. <j>v; 
which is, in its turn, equivalent to " anything which were 
identical with A, would, in any conceivable universe, neces-
sarily have $ " or to " A could not have existed in any 
possible world without having <j>"; just as the proposition 
" In any possible world a right angle must be an angle," is, I take 
it, just equivalent to (x): x is a right angle. ent . x is an angle. 
Having thus got what is meant by asserting of a particular 
term A and a particular relational property <£, which A in fact 
possesses, that <j> is " internal to " A, we can then express what 
I am calling the dogma of internal relations, or the dogma 
that all relational properties are internal to the terms which 
 by guest on June 10, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS. 55 
have them, by saying that what it asserts is: that, for all 
those values of <f> which are relational properties, the pro-
position " (x, y):. <px: ) : -»- <j>y. ent. y ^ x " is true : or (to give 
the equivalent form) the proposition 
" (x, y):. <f>x:) : y = x. en t . <f)y." 
This assertion that, for all those values of <£ which are 
relational properties, this proposition is true is what I called 
proposition (2) above, and is what I maintain to be obviously 
false. What I maintain to be true is that for some values 
of <l>, which are relational properties, the proposition 
" (x, y) :.$x:) : -»- <f>y. e n t . y ^= x " 
is true, and that for others it is false: and those values of cf> 
for which it is true I propose to call " internal relational 
properties," those for which it is false ".external relational 
properties." 
And now let us contrast (2) in this form, with what I 
called above proposition (1), and which I admit to be true, and 
which I suggested has led to the assertion of (2) through 
confusion. What (1) asserts is that, for all values of <f>, the 
proposition "(x, y):.<f>x.^<f>y:ent:x ^ y " is true; or (what is 
logically equivalent to this), the proposition 
" (x, y).: tjxc: eat :~<f)y.).y J: x" 
is true. In other words, it asserts that, if you take a par-
ticular relational property <j>, and a particular term A which 
has it, then, whatever $ and A may be, the proposition that A 
has <j> allows the deduction that, as a matter of fact, no 
term, which is without <f>, is identical with A. It does not for a 
moment assert that from the proposition that A has <f> it follows 
that no term which did not could be identical with A ; nor even 
(which is all that (2) asserts) that in no case is the proposition 
that a particular term has a particular relational property true, 
and the proposition, that no term could be without that pro-
perty and yet be identical with the term in question, false. 
(2) therefore, is neither identical with nor follows from (1). To 
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say that it does follow from it is to say that from p. q : ent : r 
it follows that p : ) : q . ent . r; which can be easily seen to be 
false by taking for p and q the two premisses of a syllogism in 
Barbara, and for r the conclusion. The conjunction, " All men 
are mortal and Socrates is a man" does entail " Socrates is 
mortal." But it is obviously not the case that there follows 
from this what "p: ) :q .exit .r" asserts; namely, that it is not 
the case that " All men are mortal" is true and the proposition 
" ' Socrates is a mortal' follows from ' Socrates is a man,'" false. 
The proposition that " Socrates is a mortal" follows from 
" Socrates is a man " is false; and yet " All men are mortal" 
may quite well be true. Or, to take the alternative form of (1). 
To say that (2) follows from (1) is to say that from p: ent: q . ) . r 
there follows the proposition: p : ) : q . ent . r. But this again 
can be easily seen to be false in the same way. The proposition 
" All men are mortal" does entail that " Socrates is a man " 
materially implies (to use Mr. Eussell's expression for )) 
" Socrates is mortal"; that is to say, it entails that it is not the 
case both that " Socrates is a man " is true, and " Socrates is 
mortal" false. But it does not in the least follow from this 
that " All men are mortal" materially implies that " Socrates is 
a mortal " follows from " Socrates is a man "; on the contrary, 
it may, as we have seen, quite well be the case that " All men 
are mortal" is true, and yet the proposition that " Socrates is a 
man " entails " Socrates is a mortal" false. 
To maintain, therefore, that (2) follows from (1) is mere 
confusion. And the source of the confusion is, I think, pretty 
plain: (1) allows you to assert that, if </>A is true, then the 
proposition "~^ <f>y . ) . y^A." must be true. And what the 
" must" here expresses is merely that this proposition follows 
from the hypothesis <£A, not that it is in itself a necessary 
proposition. But it is supposed, through confusion, that what 
is asserted is that, on the hypothesis <£A, "-^-<f>y . ) . y ^ A " is in 
itself, a necessary proposition, that is to say, that </>A materially 
implies " ~</>y . ent . y^A."—a thing which is true, if <j> is an 
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internal relational property, and false if it is an external one. 
I have here used the phrase " a proposition which is necessary 
in itself," and have implied a definition of it. The definition 
may he roughly indicated by saying: " j>x . ) . -tyx is a pro-
position that is necessary in itself (or apodeictic)," means 
" <j>x . ent . yjrx." That is to say, I am maintaining that 
$x ) yjrx is a necessary truth, if and only if it is also true that 
§x ent yjrx. This seems to me to give what has in fact been 
generally meant in philosophy by " necessary truths," e.g., by 
Leibniz; and to point out the distinction between them and 
mere matters of fact. Using this language, what the dogma 
of internal relations asserts may, I think, be expressed by saying 
that it asserts that, on the hypothesis that <f> A is true, cj>A is itself 
a necessary truth ; since <f> A is equivalent to x = A . ) . fac, and 
it asserts that, on the hypothesis <f>A, x = A . ent . <f>x. I, on 
the contrary, in asserting that some relational properties are 
external, am asserting that <£A is often a mere matter of fact 
even where it is true; that is to say, that though, where it is 
true, x = A . ) . §x, yet this is often not a necessary truth, 
since it is not true that x = A . en t . fas. 
So much for the distinction between (1) which is true, and 
(2), or the dogma of internal relations, which I hold to be false. 
But I said above, in passing, that my contention that (2) does 
not follow from (1), involves the rejection of certain views that 
have sometimes been held as to the meaning of " follows "; and 
I think it is worth while to say something about this. 
It is obvious that the possibility of maintaining that (2) 
does not follow from (1), depends upon its being true that 
from (x) : <f>x . ) . yjrx the proposition (x): <px . ent . tyx does 
not follow. And this has sometimes been disputed, and is, I 
think, often not clearly seen. 
To begin with, Mr. Eussell, in the Principles of Mathematics 
(p. 34), treats the phrase "q can be deduced from p" as if it 
meant exactly the same thing as "p)q" or "p materially 
implies q "; and has repeated the same error elsewhere, e.g., in 
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Philosophical Essays (p. 166), where, he is discussing what he 
calls the axiom of internal relations. And I am afraid a good 
many people have been led to suppose that, since Mr. Eussell 
has said this, it must be true. If it were true, then, of course, 
it would be impossible to distinguish between (1) and (2), and 
it would, follow that, since (1) certainly is true, what I am 
calling the dogma of internal relations is true too. But I 
imagine that Mr. Eussell himself would now be willing to admit 
that, so far from being true, the statement that " g can be 
deduced from p" means the same as "p) g" is simply an 
enormous "howler"; and I do not think I need spend any time 
in trying to show that it is so. 
But it may be held that, though "p ent g " does not mean 
the same as "p ) q," yet nevertheless from (x): <\>x. ) . $x, the 
proposition (x): <fix. ent. ^jrx does follow, for a somewhat more 
subtle reason; and, if this were so, it would again follow that 
what I am calling the dogma of internal relations must be true. 
I t may be held, namely, that though <£A. ent . yjrA does not 
mean simply $A . ) . -</rA, yet what it does mean is simply the 
conjunction " <f>A . ) . i/rA, and this proposition is an instance of 
a true formal implication " (the phrase " formal implication " 
being understood in Mr. Bussell's sense, in which (x): <j>x. ) . ijrx 
asserts a formal implication). This view as to what <f>A. ent. ^\A 
means has, for instance, if I understand him rightly, been 
asserted by Mr. 0. Strachey in Mind, N.S., 93; since he asserts 
that, in his opinion, this is what Professor C. I. Lewis means by 
" $A strictly implies tyA," and undoubtedly what Professor 
Lewis means by this is what I mean by <f>A. ent. A|TA. And the 
same view has been frequently suggested (though I do not know 
that he has actually asserted it) by Mr. Eussell himself {e.g., 
Principia Mathematica, p. 21). If this view were true, then, 
though (x): §x. ent . yfrx would not be identical in meaning with 
(x):cf>x.).ifrx, yet it would follow from i t ; since, if 
(x) : <f>x . ) . yfrx 
were true, then every particular assertion of the form <£A ) -«|rA> 
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would not only be true, but would be an instance of a true 
formal implication (namely (x): <j>x. ) . -tyx); and this, according 
to the proposed definition, is all that (x): <jxe. ent . ifrx asserts. 
If, therefore, it were true, it would again follow that all rela-
tional properties must be internal. But that this view also is 
untrue appears to me perfectly obvious. The proposition that 
I am in this room does materially imply that I am more than 
five years old, since both are true ; and the assertion that it 
does is also an instance of a true formal implication, since it is 
in fact true that all the persons in this room are more than 
five years old ; but nothing appears to me more obvious then 
that the second of these two propositions can not be deduced 
from the first—that the kind of relation which holds between 
the premisses, and conclusion of a syllogism in Barbara does 
not hold between thein. To put it in another way: it seems 
to me quite obvious that the properties " being a person in this 
room " and " being more than five years old " are not related in 
the kind of way in which " being a right angle " is related to 
" being an angle," and which we express by saying that, in the 
case of every term, the proposition that that term is an angle 
can be deduced from the proposition that it is a right angle. 
These are the only two suggestions as to the meaning of 
"p ent q" known to me, which, if true, would yield the result 
that (2) does follow from (1), and that therefore all relational 
properties are internal; and both of these, it seems to me, are 
obviously false. All other suggested meanings, so far as I know 
would leave it true that (2) does not follow from (1), and there-
fore that I may possibly be right in maintaining that some 
relational properties are external. I t might, for instance, be 
suggested that the last proposed definition should be amended 
as follows: that we should say : " p ent q " means " p ) q, and 
this proposition is an instance of a formal implication, which is 
not merely true but self-evident, like the laws of Formal Logic." 
This proposed definition would avoid the paradoxes involved in 
Mr. Strachey's definition, since such true formal implications as 
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" all the persons in this room are more than five years old " are 
certainly not self-evident; and, so far as I can see, it may state 
something which is in fact true of p and q, whenever and only 
when p ent q. I do not myself think that it gives the meaning 
of "pentq," since the kind of relation which I see to hold 
between the premisses and conclusion of a syllogism seems to 
me to be one which is purely " objective " in the sense that no 
psychological term, such as is involved in the meaning of " self-
evident," is involved in its definition (if it has one). 1 am not, 
however, concerned to dispute that some such definition of 
" p ent q " as this may be true. Since it is evident that, even if 
it were, my proposition that (x): <f>x. ent . tyx does not follow 
from (x): <j>x. ) . -tyx, would still be true ; and hence also my 
contention that (2) does not follow from (1). 
So much by way of arguing that we are not bound to hold 
that all relational properties are internal in the particular sense, 
with which we are now concerned, in which to say that they 
are means that in every case in which a thing A has a relational 
property, it follows from the proposition that a term has not 
got that property that the term in question is other than A. 
But I have gone further and asserted that some relational 
properties certainly are not internal. And in defence of this 
proposition I do not know that I have anything to say but that 
it seems to me evident in many cases that a term which has a 
certain relational property might quite well not have had i t : 
that, for instance, from the mere proposition that this is this, it 
by no means follows that this has to other things all the 
relations which it in fact has. Everybody, of course, must 
admit that if all the propositions which assert 'of it that it has 
these properties, do in fact follow from the proposition that 
this is this, we cannot see that they do. And so far as I can 
see, there is no reason of any kind for asserting that they do, 
except the confusion which I have exposed. But it seems to 
me further that we can see in many cases that the proposition 
that this has that relation does not follow from the fact that it 
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is this: that, for instance, the proposition that Edward VII was 
father of George V is a mere matter of fact. 
I want now to return for a moment to that other meaning of 
" internal," in which to say that <f> is internal to A means not 
merely that anything which had not <p would necessarily be 
other than A, but that it would necessarily be qualitatively 
different. I said that this was the meaning of " internal" in 
which the dogma of internal relations holds that all relational 
properties are " internal"; and that one of the most important 
consequences which followed from it, was that all relational 
properties are " internal" in the less extreme sense that we 
have just been considering. But, if I am not mistaken, there 
is another important consequence which also follows from 
it, namely, the Identity of Indiscernibles. For if it be true 
in the case of every relational property that any term which 
had not that property would necessarily be qualitatively 
different from any which had, it follows of course that, in 
the case of any two terms one of which has a relational 
property which the other has not, the two are qualitatively 
different. But, from the proposition that x is other than y, it 
does follow that x has some relational property which y 
has not; and hence, if the dogma of internal relations be 
true, it will follow that if x is other than y, x is always also 
qualitatively different from y, which is the principle of Identity 
of Indiscernibles. This is, of course, a further objection to the 
dogma of internal relations, since I think it is obvious that the 
principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is not true. Indeed, so 
far as I can see, the dogma of internal relations essentially 
consists in the jdint assertion of two indefensible propositions : 
(1) the proposition that, in the case of no relational property, 
is it true of any term which has got that property that it 
might not have had it and (2) the Identity of Indiscernibles. 
I want, finally, to say something about the phrase which 
Mr. Russell uses in the Philosophical Essays to express the 
dogma of internal relations. He says it may be expressed in 
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the form " Every relation is grounded in the natures of the 
related terms" (p. 160). And it can be easily seen, if the 
account which I have given be true, in what precise sense 
it does hold this. Mr. Russell is uncertain as to whether by 
the nature of a term is to be understood the term itself or 
something else. For my part it seems to me that by a term's 
nature is meant, not the term itself, but what may roughly be 
called all its qualities as distinguished from its relational 
properties. But whichever meaning we take, it will follow from 
what I have said, that the dogma of internal relations does 
imply that every relational property which a term has is, in a 
perfectly precise sense grounded in its nature. I t will follow 
that every such property is grounded in the term, in the 
sense that, in the case of every such property, it follows 
from the mere proposition that that term is that term that it 
has the property in question. And it will also follow that any 
such property is grounded in the qualities which the term has, 
in the sense, that if you take all the qualities which the term has, 
it will again follow in the case of each relational property, from 
the proposition that the term has all those qualities, that it has 
the relational property in question; since this is implied by the 
proposition that in the case of any such property, any term 
which had not had it would necessarily have been different in 
quality from the term in question. In both of these two senses, 
then, the dogma of internal relations does,"I think, imply that 
every relational property is grounded in the nature of every 
term which possesses i t : and in this sense that proposition is 
false. Yet it is worth noting, I think, that there is another 
sense of " grounded " in which it may quite well be true that 
every relational property is grounded in the nature of any term 
which possesses it. Namely that, in the case of every such 
property, the term in question has some quality without which 
it could not have had the property. In other words that the 
relational property entails some quality in the term, though no 
quality in the term entails the relational property. 
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